About this title: Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.
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Description: Fair. 0061316865 Cover has heavy wear. Pages are together and ready for reading. Some underlining and writing inside. Some scribbling on cover. read more
Description: Good. Twelfth Printing text. Ships fast. Expedited shipping 2-4 business days; Standard shipping 7-14 business days. Ships from USA! read more
Binding: Paperback
Publisher: Harper Perennial
Date Published: 1972
ISBN-13:9780061316869ISBN:0061316865
Description: Good. --All NEW items are exactly as provided by the publisher. All USED items are in Good condition or better, and copies may contain store stickers, highlighting, etc from normal use by previous owner(s). One-time use supplements (e.g., access codes, tear-out flash cards, reference cards, etc) provided with new copies are NOT guaranteed. --Professional booksellers: inquiries always welcome. read more
Description: Very Good. 0061316865 paperback in very good condition. Pages are clean, binding is tight. Cover has slight shelf wear. Appears gently read. Satisfaction Guaranteed. read more
Binding: Paperback
Publisher: Harper Torchbooks, New York
Date Published: 1972
ISBN-13:9780061316869ISBN:0061316865
Description: Very Good/No Jacket. 8vo 0061316865 90 pp., bilingual edition (German and English). Text unmarked, some toning to page edges. Small abrasion on front cover, light toning to covers. read more
Description: Fine. In great condition, may have minimal shelf wear. Slight tanning of pages. There is a very light crease on back cover. Satisfaction guaranteed! read more
Binding: Softcover
Publisher: Harper Torchbooks, New York
Date Published: 1985
ISBN-13:9780061316869ISBN:0061316865
Description: Good+ Parallel German and English texts. Ink blob on half-title page. Wrappers have some discolouring. Small piece missing from top corner of rear wrapper. read more
Binding: Hardcover
Publisher: WileyBlackwell
Date Published: 1974
ISBN-13:9780631120001ISBN:0631120009
Description: Hardcover, ex-library, with usual stamps and markings, in fair all round condition suitable as a reading copy. pp., 450grams, ISBN: 0631120009. read more
"I was so proud of myself when I read this book. And I even understood it, well at least got the gist of it. It's small, so it's a good philosophy book to start with."
"As recalled, this was my favorite volume of the very many produced by the clever fellows who have made careers out of his. Wittgenstein himself published very little, but an enormous body of works attributed to him have been culled from his correspondences, notebooks and students' notes of lectures and conversations.
On Certainty comes as close as Wittgenstein ever does to being a systematic philosopher rather than just playing at being a skeptic, speculator or analyst of language. It isn't original, but it is interesting to see how he seems to come to conclusions very similar to those of transcendental philosophy."
"I'm not...certain how I feel about this book. What I mean more precisely is...that...it is impossible for me to be certain how I feel about this book. In fact, it's impossible for me to really be certain of anything whatsoever. According to Mr. Ludvig Vittgen-shhhhhhhtein, that is.
On Certainty was a rather enjoyable read despite the fact that it contained 676 numbered paragraphs of somewhat repetitive analysis. But if one is as fascinated by philosophy as I am, then it's no bother. Some would say Wittgenstein is a philosopher's philosopher because he spends much of his effort debunking traditional philosophy. Here is what I can tease out of this text:
All things that we are certain of, including science, are part of a world-view. World-views are based on language and language games (meaning the "rules" we create for language, in order to understand each other.) All the things that we consider to be "certain" or sure (i.e. True), are actually premises for our language games. In other words, you can point to every fact we are so sure of, "The world is spherical," or "This is my hand," and they always end up pointing back to what are assumptions of the language game. Things we believe are so because we defined them in our language game as so. He would say that nothing is ever truly objective because there is always some lower level "fact" that points to another "fact" that points to a "fact" that points back to language. It points back to an assertion, something we are taught. Facts are really socially constructed in our worldview. Certainty is constructed meaning, not objective meaning.
Certainty has no ground. If you say, "I know the earth is round," how is that different from "I am of unshakeable conviction that the earth is round." What "I know" really means is that you are convinced of some set of rules you have been taught. LW would say that in the end every "I know" is merely a statement of your relation to an accepted world view, not a factual ground. All our grounds are merely hardened propositions accepted by each of us in order to be welcomed into a taught world-view.
There is no ground beneath her feet.
He compares the world views of different societies as well to further communicate his point. In some tribal society, it may be the shaman who causes rain, not a meteorological phenomenon. Are they demonstrably wrong? Perhaps...but what if...cause and effect were actually wrong. Scientific evidence is all based on cause and effect being true, but it's impossible to objectively demonstrate cause and effect. Even if something happens a billion times repeatedly...that is not objective proof that it will always happen that way. Or that it happens for the reason we thought it did. The future cannot be predicted. Science can suddenly alter its worldview and then suddenly the facts that were our ground, no longer are. There is no objective ground. No certainty.
Some writers claim that LW actually debunks skepticism because he claims skepticism's questions (such as "Is this all a dream?") don't fit into the language game of a given world view so they are not coherent questions. For a question to be coherent, it must fit into the language game. But I don't see that. He actually seems like the ultimate skeptic, to me. You just need to reword the questions and ask things like, "If we can't be certain of anything, because in the end language only points to itself, then how can we be certain we aren't all just in a dream?"
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